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a 
received a prison sentence, but the district court retained jurisdiction while he 
participated in a "rider." At the conclusion of the rider, a review hearing was held and a 
member of the rider staff testified against Mr. Goldsby. Thereafter, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction. 
Mr. Goldsby contends there were numerous flaws with the staff member's 
testimony at the rider review hearing, not the least of which was that she testified 
falsely. 
In this case, Mr. Goldsby filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting 
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, all relating to his counsel's 
performance in conjunction with his rider review hearing. The claim that is relevant to 
appeal is that his counsei was ineffective because, despite having in 
possession documentary evidence proving the falsity of the rider staff member's 
testimony, she failed to impeach the staff member with that evidence. This claim, 
however, was summarily dismissed along with the rest of Mr. Goldsby's petition. 
On appeal, Mr. Goldsby contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
this claim. He contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the rider staff member with the document 
already in her possession. 
1 
a single I. , pp.10, 12.)1 
a 
received a unified 
sentence of six years, with three years fixed, but the district court retained jurisdiction. 
(R. Ex., p.14.) 
During the period of retained jurisdiction ("rider"), the Idaho Department of 
Correction assigned Mr. Goldsby to the Footprints Therapeutic Community program at 
North Idaho Correctional Institution ("NICI"). (See 41672 APSI, p.8.) According to the 
addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report, which was prepared by NICI staff, 
Mr. Goldsby did not present a significant disciplinary problem at NICI. He did not 
receive any formal disciplinary sanctions over the course of his six-month rider, 
although he did receive two warnings. (41672 APSI, p.9.) This is not contested. 
On the other hand, Mr. Goldsby does dispute the NICI staff's assessment of his 
progress with his rider programming. It was alleged that he refused to address his 
1 The record on appeal in this case presently consists of two electronic (.pdf) 
documents-the Clerk's Record ("CV 13-8568 Goldsby vs State of Idaho") and the 
exhibits to the Clerk's Record ("CV 13-8568 Goldsby vs State of Idaho Exhibits"). 
Those electronic documents are cited herein as "R." and "R. Ex.," respectively. 
Additionally, contemporaneously herewith, Mr. Goldsby is filing a motion 
requesting that the Idaho Supreme Court take judicial notice of two documents from his 
prior direct appeal (Supreme Court No. 41672)-the pre-sentence investigation report 
and the addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report. Assuming that such motion 
will be granted, those documents are cited herein. The pre-sentence investigation 
report is part of an electronic (.pdf) file entitled "Andante Goldscby sealed 41672" in 
Case No. 41672. That electronic document is cited herein as "41672 PSI." 
Undersigned counsel's copy of the addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report is 
part of a 22-page electronic (.pdf) document obtained from (and apparently compiled 
by) the Supreme Court and entitled "addendum & 2 letters" in Case No. 41672. It 
includes the Supreme Court's order augmenting the record on appeal in Case No. 
41672, the addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report itself, and two letters. 
That electronic document is cited herein as "41672 APSI." 
2 
tried to from his by shifting the 
a 
in a was 
program), attempted to manipulate NICI by staff-splitting (i.e., shopping requests 
and questions around to various staff members until he got the answer he wanted), and 
participated very little in groups. (See 41672 APSI, pp.10, 12; see also 41672 APSI, 
pp.13-14 (Therapeutic Community discharge summary).) It appears that these 
concerns developed early in Mr. Goldsby's rider and dogged him throughout his time at 
NICI. Approximately two weeks after he arrived, Amanda Kaschmitter, the facilitator for 
his Cognitive Self-Change and Relapse Prevention groups (see R. Ex., p.16), became 
convinced that Mr. Goldsby had been dishonest about the circumstances of his DUI 
case and about his contention that he spent time running sober living houses in 
Spokane (see 41672 APSI, p.19). A month later, this issue came up again, as he was 
again accused of being dishonest about the circumstances of his I offense. (See 
41672 APSI, p.18.) Throughout this time, Mr. Goldsby repeatedly expressed his 
concern that he had been incorrectly labeled a liar by Ms. Kaschmitter, and that her 
perception of him was being adopted by other NICI staff. ( See 41672 APSI, p.18 
(detailing a conversation with another staff member where Mr. Goldsby voiced a 
concern that Ms. Kaschmitter "was prejudice [sic] toward him, that she called him a 
liar"), p.19 (detailing a meeting with Deputy Warden Rambo where Mr. Goldsby was 
2 While NICl's facilitating a racist comment should be offensive and troubling to anyone, 
given that Mr. Goldsby is African-American (R. Ex., p.17; 41672 PSI, p.2), the specter 
of racism would be particularly distressing for him. After all, while on a rider, he was 
completely at the mercy of NICI staff. 
3 
that staffs [sic] do not believe him regarding several issues" and indicating the 
is that ran a facil 
him to back to N staff).) 
Additionally, although the addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report and 
the attached C-Notes contain few details, they make it clear that NICI staff felt 
Mr. Goldsby was fabricating claims of racial discrimination in an effort to manipulate the 
staff and/or the program. (See, e.g., 41672 APSI, p.10 ("Other examples include 
Mr. Goldsby accusing a specific case manager of approving a 'racist' comment, when in 
actuality that case manager did not approve that Learning Experience."), p.13 ("He 
currently is not progressing in CSC due to him focusing on staff members for being 
'racist' or 'prejudiced' toward him. . . . Mr. Goldsby is at a standstill in his Relapse 
Prevention Group. He attributes this standstill as being the fault of his group facilitator 
and accuses her of being 'racist' or 'prejudiced "'),3 p.16 ("Mr. Goldsby claims that staff 
is discriminating against him. When this is addressed and dealt with, he will create 
another fabrication. Relinquish jurisdiction.").) 
Overall, Ms. Kaschmitter had a lot of negative things to say about Mr. Goldsby. 
(See, e.g., 41672 APSI, p.17 (two negative C-Notes), p.19 (one negative C-Note).) 
And, while some of the NICI staff parroted the criticisms made by Ms. Kaschmitter (see, 
e.g., 41672 APSI, pp.13-14 (summarizing Ms. Kaschmitter's assessment of 
Mr. Goldsby's performance in his CSC and Relapse Prevention groups), p.18 (C-Note 
reflecting adopted allegations earlier raised by Ms. Kaschmitter)), some had favorable 
3 It later came out that Ms. Kaschmitter was the facilitator of both Mr. Goldsby's 
Cognitive Self-Change ("CSC") group and his Relapse Prevention group. (R. Ex., p.16.) 
4 
example, early on, an noted that "Mr. Goldsby 
a in goal resume 
cover letter writing, budgeting, completing an application, and building a resource plan 
for probation." (41672 APSI, p.19.) A few weeks later, another staff member noted that 
Mr. Goldsby had "completed the requirements for NICI Food Handlers Card." (41672 
APSI, p.19.) A third staff member twice noted that Mr. Goldsby had made gains in his 
math class. (41672 APSI, pp.16, 18.) A fourth staff member noted that Mr. Goldsby 
had successfully completed the "Fathers" class, where "[h]e was an attentive student 
and regularly participated in class discussions." (41672 APSI, p.18.) Finally, a fifth staff 
member praised Mr. Goldsby's progress in the Thereapeutic Community. This staff 
member noted that when Mr. Goldsby "first came to the unit, he was uncooperative, 
very moody, never smiling, and in general a 'downer' for the unit," but that he 
demonstrated "a but steady improvement," changing his attitude and becoming 
"one of the tier coordinators", and doing 'acceptable to good' job as such." (41672 
APSI, p.17.) 
The district court held a rider review hearing to decide whether to suspend 
Mr. Goldsby's sentence and place him on probation. (See generally R. Ex., pp.15-22.) 
At that hearing, the State presented the testimony of Ms. Kaschmitter who reiterated her 
criticisms of Mr. Goldsby. (See R. Ex., pp.15-18.) In particular, she accused 
Mr. Goldsby of misrepresenting the circumstances of his DUI and failing to focus on the 
relapse that led to that DUI; she accused him of "staff-splitting"; and she accused him of 
a lack of depth in his work. (See R. Ex., pp.16-17.) With regard to the aiieged racist 
5 
had 
explained that she had 
that 
of 
had 
"allow[ing] somebody else to 
" 
had never seen learning 
experience, and had not been the staff member to approve (by initialing) that learning 
experience.4 (R. Ex., p.17.) Ms. Kaschmitter was cross-examined by Mr. Goldsby's 
counsel, who explored her potential bias and how it may have infected all of her 
assessments of Mr. Goldsby; however, defense counsel never confronted 
Ms. Kaschmitter with evidence rebutting her claims that: (a) Mr. Goldsby was untruthful 
about the circumstances of his DUI; (b) Mr. Goldsby was untruthful about his experience 
running sober living facilities; and (c) she did not sign off on the racial statement 
contained within another inmate's learning experience. (See R. Ex., pp.17-18.) 
In light of the addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report and 
Ms. Kaschmitter's testimony, the district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction instead 
suspending Mr. Goldsby's sentence and placing him on probation.5 (R. Ex., pp.21-
22.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Goldsby filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction. At a hearing on that motion, Mr. Goldsby offered new evidence 
tending to disprove Ms. Kaschmitter's contention that he had been dishonest about 
4 Although the precise statement at issue was not identified at the rider review hearing, 
it later came out that the racial comment in question was the following statement by 
another inmate: "[W]ho wants a nappy looking guy representing them, not me." (R. Ex., 
p.61.) 
5 The district court also reduced Mr. Goldsby's sentence from six years with three years 
fixed, to six years with one and one-half years fixed. (R. Ex., p.22.) 
6 
facilities. 6 R. 
I, 
, p.27; 41672 APSI, pp.20-22.) 
Goldsby's 
he was 
case 
in h 
account of that DUI during his rider. 7 (See R. Ex., p.24; 41672 PSI, pp.39-41.) Finally, 
he testified that his rider performance was far better than was characterized by 
Ms. Kaschmitter and the other members of the NICI staff. (See R. Ex., pp.23-26.) 
Nevertheless, the district court declined to reconsider its decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction. (R. Ex., pp.29-30.) The court noted that, while it appreciated Mr. Goldsby's 
factual clarifications, Mr. Goldsby had not changed the court's mind as to the proper 
6 That evidence consists of a letter from Spokane Falls Community College indicating 
that Mr. Goldsby had taken classes in the Chemical Dependency Professional program 
(41672 APSI, p.20) and a letter from a Spokane attorney who knew Mr. Goldsby 
personally and also knew of his efforts to procure rental space for a sober living facility 
(41672 APSI, pp.21-22). 
7 Ms. Kaschmitter explained the alleged dishonesty as follows: 
He told us that he was there because he had been shot and he was out 
with his wife and another couple to dinner at the Coeur d'Alene Resort to 
celebrate being alive and that a waitress had accidentally served him 
alcohol, and he got pulled over on the way home. 
I look into the stories that I'm told in these groups, and I look at 
PSl's [sic], and it was-according to his PSI he had-a bartender from the 
Torch had called the cops because he was stumbling out of the bar. And 
he got in a vehicle and drove away. And according to his PSI, the 
recording there was that he was the lone occupant in the vehicle. So his 
stories weren't matching. 
(R. Ex., p.16; see also 41672 APSI, p.19 (providing a similar summary of Mr. Goldsby's 
recounting of his DUI, but making it clear that after he had his drink, "he relapsed" and, 
presumably, continued drinking).) And, while Ms. Kaschmitter's version of events is 
substantiated by the pre-sentence investigation report (see 41672 PSI, p.2), it is at odds 
with one of the police reports, which repeatedly references a female passenger (see 
41672 PSI, p.41). In other words, it is clear that Mr. Goldsby was telling the truth and 
Ms. Kaschmitter's reliance on the pre-sentence investigation report was misplaced 
because the pre-sentence investigator got the facts wrong. 
7 
disposition of the case. (R. , pp.29-30.) In explaining this conclusion, district 
it it Mr. credible. 
a timely 
supporting affidavit. (See R., pp.4-10.) Later, Mr. Goldsby's attorney filed an 
amended verified petition (see R., pp.11-15) and a host of exhibits in support of the 
amended petition (see R., pp.13-14, 16; see generally R. Ex.; 41672 PSI; 41672 APSI). 
In his amended petition, Mr. Goldsby asserted six claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel-all relating to his counsel's performance at his rider review hearing. 
(R., pp.12-13.) The only claim relevant to the present appeal is Mr. Goldsby's fourth 
claim (claim d)-his contention that his counsel was ineffective for, "Failing to impeach 
the State's witness at the Jurisdictional Review Hearing with evidence that counsel had 
in her possession." (R., p.13.) Although this claim was left fairly ambiguous in the 
amended petition, it would later be explained by Mr. Goldsby's counsel. 
The State filed an in which it denied all of Mr. Goldsby's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.18-20.) It also filed a motion and supporting 
memorandum seeking summary dismissal of the petition in its entirety. (R., pp.21-29, 
30.) With regard to claim d, the whole of the State's argument was as follows: 
"Regarding a failure to impeach, the areas of cross-examination are an area at 
counsel's discretion. The presumption is that counsel acted appropriately and failure to 
conduct the examination that, in hindsight, might have been better does not establish 
ineffectiveness." (R., p.27.) 
In response to the State's motion to dismiss, Mr. Goldsby filed a memorandum 
arguing that summary dismissal was inappropriate. (R., pp.31-40.) With regard to his 
8 
the in his petition (which was in the hands 
was a a 
comment in question. (R., p.36.) (This letter will be referenced herein as the "Apology 
& Commitment" letter.) Mr. Goldsby also explained that, although Ms. Kaschmitter 
claimed not to have signed off on that inmate's letter and, in fact, claimed to have been 
exonerated in an NICI investigation based on the finding that it did not bear her initials, 
the written copy in counsel's possession bore the notation "OK," followed by her initials, 
"AK." (R., p.36.) He also referenced the Apology & Commitment letter, which was 
contained in Exhibit H of the documents he provided in conjunction with the filing of his 
amended petition. (See R. Ex., p.61.)8 
The district court did not hold a hearing on the State's motion for summary 
dismissal. Instead, it issued an order dismissing Mr. Go!dsby's petition in toto. With 
regard to d, the court's rationale for dismissing was as follows: 
"Petitioner has failed to show any standard requiring trial counsel to impeach in the 
manner petitioner describes. In addition, petitioner has not shown a reasonable 
probability that, had trial counsel presented such impeachment evidence, the outcome 
would have been different."9 (R., p.49.) 
8 In the copy of the Apology & Commitment letter presently in the record on appeal, the 
notation, "OK AK" is faint and very difficult to read. (See R. Ex.,p.61.) Accordingly, 
Mr. Goldsby is filing a motion to substitute a more legible copy of that letter for that 
which is presently in the record. 
9 The district court used virtually identical generic language with regard to four of 
Mr. Goldsby's six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See R., pp.46-50.) 
9 
the district court a written judgment in (see 
filed a 
10 
have summarily dismissed this claim? 
11 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Goldsby Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Defense 
Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Impeach A State's 
Witness With Evidence Disproving Her Testimony, Such That It Was Error For The 
District Court To Have Summarily Dismissed This Claim 
Introduction 
In order to sur,1ive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present 
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in his 
favor, would entitle him to post-conviction relief. Here, because Mr. Goldsby has 
alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his rider review hearing 
when his counsel failed to impeach at witness (Ms. Kaschmitter) with certain 
documentary evidence (a copy of the Apology & Commitment letter) which appears to 
disprove her testimony, in order for him to survive summary dismissal, he was obligated 
to present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact as to two 
elements-whether counsel's performance was deficient in failing to impeach the 
witness, and whether that deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Goldsby's defense. 
Mr. Goldsby has done so. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The United States Constitution "guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process 
Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 
(1984). One such provision is the right to the assistance of counsel, U.S. CONST. 
amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the 
12 
his ") j as 
is a an 
assistance in contravention of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. The threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., 
whether it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under 
prevailing professional norms." Id. at 687-91. Assuming there has been deficient 
performance, the next inquiry is whether that deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Id. at 687, 691-96. In order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown 
"that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case" 
since the "result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding 
itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence to have determined the outcome." Id. 693-94. Instead, it need only be 
shown is a reasonable probability that, for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, of proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 
In Idaho, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are most appropriately raised 
through a petition for post-conviction relief. See Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96 
(Ct. App. 2004); see also I C. § 19-4901 (a) (identifying the bases upon which post-
conviction relief may be sought). A petition for post-conviction telief is separate and 
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. 
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456 (1991 ). It is a civil proceeding governed by the 
Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (LC. §§ 19-4901 to -
4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civii Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is 
13 
proceeding, the petitioner must prove his 
V. 1 81 816 
differs 
by a preponderance of 
1995). 
complaint initiating a 
petition 
action. A 
post-conviction petition is required to include more than "a short and plain statement of 
claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." 
Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to 
dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment in other 
civil proceedings, the UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a 
of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c).10 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this 
standard, the district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." 
Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17. However, if the petitioner presents some evidentiary 
support for his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as 
true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 
Idaho 643, 646 (1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on their face. 
10 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for 
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g., 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under section 
19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of material fact has been 
presented). 
14 
after State controverts petitioner's allegations can district 
v. State, 103 61 5 1 
in it 
favor of the petitioner. Small, 132 Idaho at 331. 11 
if a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331. If there is no 
question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can 
be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). 
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal 
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006). 
Mr. Goldsby Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding Whether His 
Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance In Failing To Impeach 
Ms. Kaschmitter's Testimony With The Apology & Commitment Letter 
As discussed above, Ms. Kaschmitter testified unflatteringly of Mr. Goldsby's 
performance on his rider. Among the testimony she gave was an explanation of her 
role in the racial statement made by another inmate in a group setting: 
Q. Do you recall any sort of inquiry or investigation regarding racial 
comments made by you against Mr. Goldsby? 
A I never made a racial comment towards Mr. Goldsby. There was 
one major event that really came out that he stated in a concern form, I 
think it was, for a program manager or deputy warden that I allowed 
somebody else to read a racial comment that they had written in one of 
their learning experiences in front of the entire family. And ultimately what 
11 The district court need not accept those of the petitioner's aiiegations which are 
"clearly disproved by the record." Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996). 
15 
came out of that were the initials of the staff that actually approved that 
teaming experience were not even mine. I had never seen the learning 
experience. And he was informed of that by our 
that it was me to 
, p.17 (emphasis added).) 
As it turned out though, Mr. Goldsby's counsel had in her possession a written 
copy of the Apology & Commitment letter containing the racial statement at issue, and 
bearing the notation, "OK," followed by what appear to be Ms. Kaschmitter's initials, 
"AK." (See R., pp.13, 36; R Ex., p.61.) Thus, counsel had at her disposal documentary 
evidence which appeared to directly contradict Ms. Kaschmitter's claim that her initials 
were not on the Apology & Commitment letter, and that she had never seen that letter. 
Counsel could have used this letter to not only impeach Ms. Kaschmitter's testimony on 
the subject of whether she had facilitated an offensive, racist statement, but a!so her 
credibility generally. The former objective was important because, as noted above, NICI 
staff were highly critical of what they perceived to be Mr. Goldsby's baselessly accusing 
them of racial discrimination. (See, e.g., 41672 APSI, p.16.) And the latter objective 
was important because much of the criticism leveled at Mr. Goldsby during his rider was 
derived from Ms. Kaschmitter and, thus, its believability came down to her credibility. 
Further, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that counsel's failure to 
attempt to impeach Ms. Kaschmitter's testimony was some sort of strategic or tactical 
decision on the part of counsel. (See R. Ex., pp.1-2 (affidavit of counsel making no 
mention of her failure to impeach Ms. Kaschmitter with the Apology & Commitment 
letter).) And the reasonable inference is that this was not a strategic decision on the 
part of counsel At the rider review hearing, defense counsel went after 
Ms. Kaschmitter, attempting to undermine her credibility on muitiple fronts. Counsel 
16 
that was biased against Goldsby 
1 
a 18 
fact that Ms. Kaschmitter wrote that in the C-Notes that Mr. Goldsby had to be "watched 
carefully" even though he had only been at NICI for about two weeks); and she implied 
that Ms. Kaschmitter was testifying against Mr. Goldsby because she had a particular 
problem with him (see R. Ex., p.18 (eliciting testimony that Ms. Kaschmitter had never 
written a positive C-Note about Mr. Goldsby and questioning why Ms. Kaschmitter was 
testifying instead of Mr. Goldsby's counselor)). In light of this aggressive questioning, 
there could no legitimate strategy to failing to impeach Ms. Kaschmitter's testimony with 
the notation at the bottom of the Apology & Commitment letter, which appears to directly 
contradict her testimony. 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Goldsby submits that his counsel rendered deficient 
by failing to use Apology & Commitment letter to impeach 
Ms. Kaschmitter's rider review hearing testimony. 
D. Mr. Goldsby Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding Whether His 
Counsel's Deficient Performance In Failing To Impeach Ms. Kaschmitter's 
Testimony With The Apology & Commitment Letter Prejudiced His Defense 
Just as he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel's 
performance was deficient, so too he raise a genuine of material fact as to 
whether that deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Had his counsel impeached 
Ms. Kaschmitter's rider review hearing testimony with the Apology & Commitment letter, 
there is a reasonable possibility that he would have received probation-either at the 
rider review hearing or in response to Idaho ("Rule 35") 
17 
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some successes in his programming; however, they also reveal he was heavily 
criticized for dishonesty, manipulation, and apathy. Nevertheless, the district court was 
considering placing Mr. Goldsby on probation. (See R. Ex., p.22 ("The report comes 
back recommending that I relinquish jurisdiction. The hearing had been continued from 
July 11. The parties were going to look into mental health court. At that time I'd 
indicated that, if mental health court didn't work out, one thing I was considering was 
placing him on probation with an additional period of local incarceration ").) 
Of course, that is not ultimately what happened. After Ms. Kaschmitter testified 
at the rescheduled rider review hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction 
instead of suspending Mr. Goldsby's sentence and placing him on probation. Thus, 
Kaschmitter's scathing criticism of Mr. Goldsby may have been the difference-
maker. But even if her testimony was not the single most important factor leading the 
district court to relinquish jurisdiction, her comments generally must have weighed very 
heavily against Mr. Goldsby. Not only did Ms. Kaschmitter testify against Mr. Goldsby, 
but, as the facilitator of his CSC and Relapse Prevention groups, she was also the 
driving force behind many of the most critical comments about him in the addendum to 
the pre-sentence investigation report and the attached C-Notes. In light of the 
inordinate influence Ms. Kaschmitter had, there is at least a reasonable possibility that 
undermining her credibility generally (by showing her to have testified falsely that she 
18 
did sign off on the Apology & Commitment letter) would have 
a 
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dishonest have since been undermined through the presentation of new evidence in 
support of Mr. Goldsby's Rule 35 motion, impeaching Ms. Kaschmitter's apparently-
false testimony about not having facilitated a racial statement by another inmate would 
have had a cumulative effect in diminishing the value of her assessment of Mr. Goldsby, 
thus making. Thus, even if Ms. Kaschmitter's impeachment did not sufficiently 
undermine her criticism of Mr. Goldsby so as to warrant probation at the rider review 
hearing, when considered alongside the evidence presented with the Rule 35 motion, 
there is a reasonable probability the outcome of that motion would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Goldsby respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's judgment and its order summarily dismissing his petition, and 
that it remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Goldsby's 
claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Ms. Kaschmitter with the 
inmate essay 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2015. 
RIK R. LEH)1 EN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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